Abstract-In this paper, we propose a passivity-based methodology for analysis and design of reinforcement learning in multi-agent finite games. Starting from a known exponentiallydiscounted reinforcement learning scheme, we show that convergence to a Nash distribution can be shown in the class of games characterized by the monotonicity property of their (negative) payoff. We further exploit passivity to propose a class of higher-order schemes that preserve convergence properties, can improve the speed of convergence and can even converge in cases whereby their first-order counterpart fail to converge. We demonstrate these properties through numerical simulations for several representative games.
I. INTRODUCTION
In multi-agent reinforcement learning in games, an agent repeatedly adjusts his strategy in response to a stream of payoffs which are in turn dependent on the actions of the other agents. The objective is for agents to arrive at a strategy profile that yields the best obtainable outcome for each of them, under information-constraints or in the presence of noise. Whether such an action profile can be reached depends on the learning process used by the collection of these agents. Learning in finite games typically involves discrete-time stochastic processes, where stochasticity arises from the agents' randomized choices, [1] - [7] . A key approach to analyzing such processes is based on the ordinary differential equation (ODE) method of stochastic approximation, a method which relates their behaviour to that of a "mean field" ODE, [8] . Motivated by this, we follow [5] , [9] , [10] , [12] and consider a reinforcement learning scheme directly in continuous-time. By so doing, we are able to focus on the relationship between reinforcement learning, convex analysis, and passivity. 1 Our starting point is a variant of the continuous-time exponentially-discounted learning (EXP-D-RL) in [5] , versions of which are also known as the exponential-weight algorithm [12] , or Q-learning, [3] , [6] . Under this continuoustime learning process, each agent maintains a vector of scores for all his actions, based on aggregation of his exponentiallydiscounted stream of payoffs. These scores are then converted into mixed strategies using a static logit (soft-max) rule which assigns choice probabilities proportionally to the exponential of each action's score. The resulting learning dynamics describes the evolution of the scores (dual variables), rather than of the mixed strategies (primal variables). The same score dynamics results also from stochastic-approximation of a Qlearning scheme, which was shown in [3] to converge to a Nash distribution (logit equilibria) in 2-player zero-sum and partnership (potential) games. It is also related to the scheme proposed in [6] for traffic games in a repeated-game setup and shown to converge to a Nash distribution in N -player potential games. The strategy dynamics induced by this score dynamics is analyzed in [5] and proved to converge towards logit equilibria in potential games. With the exception of [3] , the majority of these works have focused exclusively on convergence in potential games, [4] - [6] , [13] . In contrast, less attention has been paid to stable games [14] , [15] , which encompass zero-sum games, potential games with concave payoffs and include well-known examples from evolutionary game theory such as the Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) game.
Motivated by the above, in this paper, we exploit passivity techniques and the natural monotonicity property associated with this class of games to show convergence to a Nash distribution. The use of passivity to investigate game dynamics was first proposed in [16] for population games, based on the notion of δ-passivity. The authors showed that certain game dynamics and the class of stable games, naturally satisfy this type of passivity. The coupling between a δ-passive system with a stable game implies a stable behaviour in the closedloop solution. [17] showed that if an evolutionary dynamic does not satisfy a passivity property, then it is possible to construct a higher-order stable game that results in instability. Here we use an alternative concept, that of equilibriumindependent passivity, [18] . This allows us to directly address convergence towards equilibria. We note that equilibriumindependent passivity was used recently in [19] for continuouskernel games, to relax the assumption on perfect-information on other players' actions.
Contributions. Our contributions are twofold: we show (1) that a passivity framework can be used to prove convergence of reinforcement learning in finite games, and (2) that its principles can be used towards designing higher-order learning dynamics that preserve convergence to a Nash distribution. Our approach is based on reformulating the overall learning dynamics of all agents as a feedback interconnected system. We show that the continuous-time EXP-D-RL scheme, [5] , can be naturally posed as a payoff-feedback system in the dual space, where the forward system satisfies more than passivity, namely it is output strictly (equilibrium-independent) passive. We exploit its particular storage function, related to a Bregman divergence, as a Lyapunov function and show convergence of EXP-D-RL to a Nash distribution (logit equilibrium) in any N -player game for which the (negative) payoff is merely monotone, not necessarily strict. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first convergence result for such games. This class of games corresponds to the class of stable games in population games [15] , and to the class of monotone games in continuous games, [20] . It subsumes, in the case of finite-action games, potential games with concave potential, 2-player zero-sum games, as in [3] , as well as the standard 2-player RPS game. Key to our approach is the fact that we analyze convergence based on the natural, score dynamics, which are in the dual (payoff) space, as in [6] . This is contrast to analyzing the induced strategy dynamics as done in [5] , and is unlike the indirect analysis done in [3] , via connection to the smooth best-response. Unlike [5] , [6] , we show convergence to a Nash distribution in games that go beyond the class of potential games, for example the RPS games or the Shapley game. Furthermore, we exploit cocoercivity of the soft-max to show convergence even for hypo-monotone games (corresponding to unstable games in [15] ), such as unstable RPS games and Shapley's game, is the temperature parameter is above a certain threshold. To achieve this, we balance the game shortage of passivity (hypo-monotonicity) by the excess passivity coming from the soft-max map (cocoercivity).
In the second part of the paper, we build on the passivity interpretation and propose a method to design higher-order extensions of EXP-D-RL. Higher order dynamics, via the introduction of auxiliary states, can have different properties. They can have significant benefits fostering convergence in larger classes of games, as shown in [10] , [11] for fictitiousplay/gradient-play and in evolutionary games. In reinforcement learning, higher-order extensions of the un-discounted reinforcement learning have been proposed in [7] based on second or n-th order payoff-integration (equivalent to a cascade modification of the first-order replicator dynamics by a chain of integrators). These dynamics have been shown to lead to the elimination of weakly dominated strategies, followed by the iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies, a property not exhibited by standard replicator dynamics. However, as shown in [17] , such cascade augmentation does not guarantee that passivity/convergence properties are preserved when extending from first to higher-order dynamics. Our second result shows that if higher-order dynamics are built by feedback modification via a passive system that preserves the equilibrium point, convergence to a Nash distribution can be guaranteed in the same class of games. We explicitly build a second-order learning scheme based on this method, by specifying a particular LTI positive-real system for the feedback modification path. We show numerically that these higher-order dynamics can converge faster and, in some cases, can converge in larger classes of games (more hypo-monotone) than the first-order scheme. A short version of this paper will appear in [37] .
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides background material. Section III introduces the continuoustime score-based EXP-D-RL reinforcement learning scheme. Section IV provides convergence analysis of the first-order EXP-D-RL scheme. Section V proposes and analyzes a class of higher-order dynamics. Section VI discusses connections to population games. Section VII discusses several examples and presents simulation results. Section VIII provides the conclusions.
II. BACKGROUND A. Convex Optimization and Monotone Operator Theory
The following is from [20] , [22] . Let z ∈ R n , z = [z 1 , ..., z n ] , also denoted as z = (z 1 , ..., z n ) or z = (z i ) i={1,...,n} . We assume that R n is equipped with the standard inner product z, z := n i=1 z i z i = z z and the induced 2-norm z 2 := z, z . An operator (or mapping)
where ∇f is its gradient, and strictly convex if and only if
F is referred to as firmly nonexpansive for β = 1.
B. Equilibrium Independent Passivity
The following are obtained from [18] , [23] . Consider Σ
with z ∈ R n , u ∈ R q , y ∈ R q , f locally Lipschitz, h continuous. Consider a differentiable function V : R n → R. The time derivative of V along solutions of (1) isV (z) = ∇V (z) f (z, u) or justV . Let u, z, y be an equilibrium condition, such that 0 = f (z, u), y = h(z, u). Assume there exists Γ ⊂ R q and a continuous function k z (u) such that for any constant u ∈ Γ, f (k z (u), u) = 0 (basic assumption). Definition 1. System Σ (1) is Equilibrium Independent Passive (EIP) if it is passive with respect to u and y; that is for every u ∈ Γ there exists a differentiable, positive semi-definite storage function
Σ is output-strictly EIP (OSEIP) if there is a β > 0 such thaṫ
EIP requires that (2) holds for every u ∈ Γ (Σ to be passive independent of the equilibrium point), while traditional passivity, [21] requires that it holds only for a particular u (usually associated with the origin as equilibrium). EIP properties help in deriving stability and convergence properties for feedback systems without requiring exact knowledge of an equilibrium point, but rather only that it exists. The parallel interconnection of two EIP systems is an EIP system, and the feedback interconnection of two EIP systems that satisfies the basic assumption is an EIP system (cf. Property 2 and 3 in [18] ). When system Σ is just a static map, EIP is equivalent to incrementally passivity. and to monotonicity. A static nonlinear function y = F (u) is defined to be EIP (OSEIP) if F is monotone (β-cocercive). A linear (output strictly) passive system,ż = Az+Bu, y = Cz+Du, with (A, B) controllable, (A, C) observable, and A invertible is (OS)EIP (cf. Ex. 1 in [18] ). This can be shown using V (z − z), where V is the quadratic storage function associated with the passivity of the linear system relative to the origin equilibrium, by direct application of the KYP lemma (cf. Section 6.4 of [21] ). The additional requirement of invertibility of A is necessary to satisfy the basic assumption on the existence and continuity of k z , which is defined by k z (u) = −A −1 Bu. The equilibrium input-output map is defined by k y (u) = (−CA −1 B + D)u.
C. Games in Normal Form
Consider a game G between a set of players (agents) N = {1, . . . , N }, where each player p ∈ N has a finite set of actions (or pure strategies) A p , and a payoff U p : A → R, with A = p∈N A p the overall action set of all players, [9] . Let |A p | = n p and n = p∈N n p . Without loss of generality we identify A p as the corresponding index set, i.e., A p = {1, . . . , n p } and denote a generic action as i ∈ A p . Let x p = (x p i ) i∈A p denote the mixed strategy of player p, a probability distribution over his set of actions A p . Then
is the set of mixed strategies for player p. A mixed strategy profile is denoted as x = (x 1 , . . . , x N ) ∈ ∆, where ∆ := p∈N ∆ p is called the game's strategy space. We also use the shorthand notation x = (x p ; x −p ) where x −p is the strategy profile of the other players except p. Player p's expected payoff to using x p in the mixed strategy profile
where
, his expected payoff corresponding to using pure strategy i ∈ A p in the mixed profile x ∈ ∆. Note that we can write (4) as
or
is called the payoff vector of player p at x ∈ ∆, indicating the duality pairing between x p and U p , [9] . With the players' (expected) payoffs U p : ∆ → R, the tuple (N , ∆, U) is called the mixed extension of G also denoted by G.
Define the mixed best-response map of player p,
or x ∈ BR(x ), where BR = (BR p ) p∈N , i.e., x is a fixed-point of the overall best-response map of all players. Alternatively, by (5), (6) 
) p∈N , denotes the payoff vector of the entire set of players, or the game (static) map. Thus x can be equivalently characterized as a solution of the variational inequality, VI(−U, ∆), (8) , [20] .
III. EXPONENTIALLY-DISCOUNTED LEARNING (EXP-D-RL)
In the following, we describe the score-based reinforcement learning (RL) scheme, modeled in continuous-time as in [5] , [7] , [9] . Each player keeps a score z p based on his received payoff U p , and maps it into a strategy x p ∈ ∆ p . He plays the game G according to the strategy x p . This process is repeated indefinitely, with an infinitesimal time-step between each stage; hence can be modeled in continuous-time, as a three stage process, described as follows:
Starting from an initial score, he updates it based on exponentially-discounted aggregation (learning) (EXP-D-RL) of his own payoff stream,
where u p i (t) = U . The case G(s) = 1 s , i.e., integration of the (un-discounted) payoff is studied in [9] , [7] . (2) Choice Stage: Each player p maps his own score z p ∈ R n p , into a mixed strategy x p ∈ ∆ p using a choice map, e.g. the best-response choice,
p is single-valued, an at-least strictly convex function ψ p called regularizer is used, [9] , which yields the regularized/smooth best-response choice,
Depending on the context, the regularizer is also referred to as admissible deterministic perturbation, penalty function, smoothing function, barrier function or Bregman function. For detailed construction of the regularizer, [9] . We consider the commonly used (negative) Gibbs entropy,
for which the choice map (10) is the soft-max function [9] ,
is the (relative) interior of the simplex ∆ p . is typically referred to as the temperature parameter. For = 1, (12) is known as the standard soft-max function. As → ∞, actions are selected with uniform probability, and as → 0, the soft-max function selects the action associated with the highest score, provided that the difference between any two scores is not too small. With σ p , the mixed strategy for player p is taken as,
Each player p plays the game G according to his strategy x p and records his own payoff vector (13), and σ p in (12), the EXP-D-RL scheme for player p ∈ N is written as, z
Remark 1. Similar forms of "exponentially-discounted" score dynamics have been investigated in [5] [6], [26] . When γ = 1, (14) coincides with the learning rule studied in [5] for the discount factor T = 1. When γ = 1 there is a slight difference: we use γ not only as a discount factor (as T in [5] ), but also as a multiplicative factor (learning rate), and by doing so the rest points of (14) are independent of γ. Structurally, EXP-D-RL is similar to online mirror descent (OMD) in convex optimization, recently studied for continuous games in [27] , [28] . In particular, the score z p is the dual variable to the primal variable x p . Therefore, (14) describes the evolution of learning in the dual space R n p , whereas the induced strategy trajectory describes the evolution in the primal space ∆ p . This type of duality is discussed in [9] . Lastly, we note that using stochastic approximation, (14) corresponds to the individual Q-learning algorithm, which has been shown to converge in 2-player zero-sum games and 2-player partnership games (Proposition 4.2, [3] ).
Remark 2. Note that a first-order Euler discretization of the dynamics (14) , with discretization step α, is
iA p is the mixed-strategy and X p i (k) the probability of playing i ∈ A p at the k-th instance of play. This recursion tracks (14) arbitrarily well over finite-time horizons when the discretization step α is sufficiently small, but requires perfect monitoring of the mixed strategies of the other players. This can be relaxed if players are assumed to possess a bounded, unbiased estimate of their actions' payoffs, or if they observe their in-game realized payoffs. In fact, (14) is the mean field of the discrete-time stochastic process, [8] ,
, and {α(k)} is a diminishing sequence of step-sizes, e.g. . If player p can observe the action profile i −p (k) played by his opponents (or can otherwise calculate his strategies' payoffs), such an estimate is provided byû
, [5] , [9] , where division by X p i (k) compensates for the infrequency with which the score of the i-th strategy is updated. Results from the theory of stochastic approximation [8] can be used to tie convergence of such discrete-time algorithms to the asymptotic behaviour of (14), (see [5] ). In this paper we restrict our focus to the continuous-time learning scheme, as in [9] , [10] , [12] .
IV. CONVERGENCE OF EXP-D-RL DYNAMICS
In this section we analyze the convergence of EXP-D-RL, (14) .
) p∈N denote the score vector, stacked mixed-strategies and the overall payoff vector for all players, respectively. With (14) , EXP-D-RL is written all players as
Given that the payoff functions U p (x) are Lipschitz and bounded on ∆, the scores z p (t) will remain finite for all t ≥ 0, so x(t) = σ(z(t)) will be defined for all t ≥ 0 and x(t) ∈ ∆ for all t ≥ 0. Moreover, x p i (t) > 0, t ≥ 0, hence only strategy trajectories on the interior of the simplex are obtained. Note 
and u = U (x), where U is the game (static) map. In the following we characterize the asymptotic behaviour of solutions of (15) .
A. Equilibrium Points of EXP-D-RL
System (15) is written as,
is Lipschitz (we show in Proposition 2) and since U is Lipschitz and bounded, existence and uniqueness of global solutions of (17) follows from standard arguments. An equilibrium (rest) point z is z = (U • σ)(z ), hence a fixed point of the map z → (U • σ)(z). The existence of a fixed point is guaranteed by Brouwer's fixed-point theorem provided that U • σ is a continuous function with bounded range [6] . Based on (16) , such a z can be represented as,
From (18), it follows that, over the set of rest points of (17) , the function z → σ(z ) has an inverse given by x → U (x ). As shown next, any x = σ(z ) corresponding to (18) is a Nash equilibrium of a game with perturbed payoff (Nash distribution), and for small it approximates the Nash equilibria of G, (see also [32] and Proposition 2, [6] ). Note that as → ∞, all actions of each player p are selected with uniform probability 1/n p and there exists a unique x at the centroid of the simplex ∆.
, where z is a rest point of (17) , is a Nash equilibrium of game G with perturbed payoff,
. On the other hand, by (7) and (5), a Nash equilibrium of G with perturbed payoff (19) , is a fixed-point of the (perturbed) best-response function BR = (BR p ) p∈N , where
where z = U (x), which are exactly (18) .
Remark 3. We note that x = σ(z ) corresponding to (18) is referred to as a Nash distribution, [3] , a (perturbed) logit equilibrium of the game [15, p. 191] , or a type of quantal response equilibrium (QRE), [31] . It satisfies x = σ(U (x )) := BR(x )), hence is a fixed-point of σ •U , which also exists by Brouwer's fixed point theorem (Theorem 1, [31] ) and is parameterized by . At a Nash distribution x each player plays a smooth best-response (σ p ) to payoffs arising from the others' play. 
the log-sum-exp function, (C 2 and convex by [22, p. 72] ). Since the following properties are valid for σ p , (12) , for all p ∈ N , without loss of generality, we consider p = 1 (drop the superscript) and denote σ and lse. Note that σ is not injective and σ(z + c1) = σ(z), for all z ∈ R n , c ∈ R, where
Proposition 2. The soft-max function σ : R n → int(∆) satisfies the following properties: (i) σ is gradient of lse :
where > 0 is the temperature constant.
Proof. (i) Evaluating the partial derivative of lse in (20) at each
(ii) The log-sum-exp function is C 2 and convex, based on positive semi-definiteness of ∇ 2 lse(z) [22, p. 74] . Together with (i), this implies that σ is monotone. (iii) For the Hessian of lse, it can be shown ( [22, p. 74 
. By (i) and Theorem 2.1.6 in [25] , σ is −1 -Lipschitz. (iv) -cocoercivity of σ follows directly from the BaillonHaddad theorem [34, p. 40] , since σ is the gradient of lse by (i), and is −1 -Lipschitz by (iii). (21) or, equivalently, output-strictly EIP (OSEIP).
Next, we characterize Σ (16). Proposition 3. System Σ (16) is output-strictly EIP (OSEIP).
Proof. At an equilibrium condition of (16), z = u and x = σ(z). Consider the following candidate storage function, 
Using (21) in the foregoing yieldṡ
is the Bregman divergence of lse p , i.e. the difference between the log-sum-exp function and its linear approximation at z p , [25] . Using Theorem 2.1.5, [25] ,
C. Convergence Analysis
Next, based on the representation in Figure 1 (feedback interconnection between Σ, (16) and the static game map −U on the feedback path), we analyze the asymptotic behaviour of EXP-D-RL (15) by leveraging passivity properties of Σ.
First, solutions z(t) of (15) 
From the integral form of EXP-D-RL, we can write for all p ∈ N , i ∈ A p , |z
We make the following assumption on the payoff U .
(ii) The negative payoff, −U (·), is µ-hypo-monotone, i.e.,
for some µ > 0, for all x, x ∈ ∆.
Remark 6. The monotonicity in Assumption 1(i) (µ = 0) is equivalent −U (·) being EIP and incrementally passive. In population games, Assumption 1(i) corresponds to G being a stable game cf. [14] , while in games with continuous actions it corresponds to games with monotone pseudo-gradient map, [20] . Assumption 1(ii) (as "hypo-monotone" in [36] ) corresponds to an unstable game and is equivalent to shortage of monotonicity (passivity) of −U (·) as described by µ > 0.
Remark 7. As in stable games, [15] , Assumption 1(i) can be characterized via y DU (x)y ≤ 0, for all x ∈ ∆, y ∈ T ∆, and Assumption 1(ii) via y DU (x)y ≤ µ y 2 2 , for all x ∈ ∆, y ∈ T ∆, where DU (x) is the Jacobian of U (x) and
is the tangent space of ∆ p . For 2-player games, U is linear and (24) can be checked based on the payoff matrices of the two players, A and B. Since
hence (24) is −(x − x ) Φ(x − x ) ≥ 0, for all x, x ∈ ∆, equivalent to y (Φ + Φ )y ≤ 0 for all y ∈ T ∆, or Φ + Φ is negative semidefinite with respect to T ∆. This is met for example in zero-sum games, where B = −A, hence Φ is skewsymmetric and x Φx = 0, for all x ∈ ∆. Another class is the class of concave potential games where the payoff vector U (x) can be expressed as the gradient of a C 1 , concave potential function P , as in congestion games, [15] , [6] , [4] . In Section VI we consider several examples. Theorem 1. Let G be a finite game with players' learning schemes as given by EXP-D-RL, (14) or (15) (Figure 1) . Assume there are a finite number of isolated fixed-points z of U • σ. Then, under Assumption 1(i), for any > 0, players' scores z(t) = (z p (t)) p∈N converge to a rest point z , while players' strategies x(t) = (x p (t)) p∈N , x(t) = σ(z(t)) converge to a Nash distribution x = σ(z ) of G. Under Assumption 1(ii), the same conclusions hold for any > µ.
Proof. The proof is based on the representation of (15) in Figure 1 and passivity properties of Σ (16) in Proposition 3.
First, recall that Ω is a compact, positively invariant set. Let z be a rest point of (17),
where V z (z ) = 0, and V z (z) ≥ 0, ∀z ∈ R n . Moreover, using (20) , ∇ lse p = σ p and j∈A p σ p j (z p ) = 1, it can be shown that V z (z + 1c) = 0, ∀c ∈ R, so V z (·) is positive semidefinite, but not positive definite. Take the time derivative of V z (z) along solutions of (17) . Then, (23) 
(27) By (16), (18), u = U (σ(z)), u = U (σ(z )) and using Assumption 1(i) for x = σ(z), x = σ(z ), it follows that the second term in (27) is non-positive, hencė
Thus for any > 0,V z (z) ≤ 0, ∀z ∈ R n , andV z (z) = 0, for all z ∈ E = {z ∈ Ω|σ(z) = σ(z )}. We apply LaSalle's invariance principle, [21] , and find the largest invariant subset M of E for (17) . On E the dynamics of (17) reduce tȯ
Since γ > 0, z(t) → z as t → ∞, for any z(0) ∈ E. Thus, no other solution except z can stay forever in E, and M consists only of equilibria. Since by assumption (17) has a finite number of isolated equilibria z , by LaSalle's invariance principle, [21] , it follows that for any z(0) ∈ Ω, z(t) converges to one of them. By continuity of σ, it follows that x(t) = σ(z(t)) converges to σ(z ) which is a Nash distribution. Alternatively, from (28) since V z (z(t)) is non-increasing and bounded from below by 0, it converges as t → ∞. Fur-
Since V z (z(t)) converges, by the comparison principle it
2 dτ exists (finite). Since x(t) is bounded,ẋ(t) is uniformly bounded in t and x(t) is uniformly continuous. From Barbalat's lemma [21] , we conclude that x(t) = σ(z(t)) converges to x = σ(z ) as t → ∞.
Under Assumption 1(ii), from (27) , instead of (28), the following inequality is obtaineḋ
. Thus, for any > µ, this is as (28) and the proof can follow as in the above. Remark 8. In general, convergence is to the set of Nash distributions. This is the case of potential games, where multiple (logit) equilibria can exist. This is the same as for the smooth best-response dynamics (cf. Theorem 3.3 [29] ). On the other hand, any 2-player zero-sum game has a unique Nash distribution, (cf. Theorem 3.2, in [29] ). Thus, Theorem 1 is similar to results for the perturbed best-response dynamics, (cf. Theorem 3.3 and 3.2, in [29] ), or Q-learning (Proposition 4.2 in [3] ), but is valid for N -player games. We note that in [5] , based on analyzing the primal (induced) strategy dynamics, Proposition 3.4 shows that x(t) converges to a logit equilibrium of G in potential games, while Theorem 3.8 shows that perturbed strict Nash equilibria are asymptotically stable for small enough T . Theorem 1 analyzes the dual (score) dynamics and shows that under Assumption 1(i) (monotonicity of −U ), players converge arbitrarily close to a Nash equilibrium (not necessarily strict), by taking small (cf. Proposition 1). Under hypo-monotonicity, Assumption 1(ii), convergence to a Nash distribution is guaranteed for > µ, based on balancing the shortage of passivity of −U by the excess passivity (OSEIP) of Σ. Our results can be also applied to monocyclic games, [30] , which only have mixed NEs and which generalize the Rock-Paper-Scissor game (see Section VI). Proposition 3 in [30] shows that in an unstable game (A is positive definite) a completely mixed perturbed NE (or an NDE) is unstable for sufficiently small under the smooth best-response dynamics. Based on Assumption 1(ii), our result in Theorem 1 characterizes the range of that guarantees convergence to a Nash distribution under EXP-D-RL dynamics in an unstable game. Of course, too large an moves the Nash distribution away from the Nash equilibrium, so a trade-off exists. Several examples are discussed in Section VI.
Remark 9. Theorem 1 is related to passivity-based feedback (PBF) output regulation [33] . In our case, the output-strictly EIP system Σ has the output x = σ(z) regulated to σ(z ) instead of to the origin, and the static output feedback is u = U (x), which itself is PBF for any payoff U satisfying Assumption 1(i). In fact, Σ is z -detectable, and z(t) converges to z (since V z is positive semidefinite, we can show only attractivity). We also note that a similar approach can be considered for the un-discounted EXP-RL in [9] , [7] , for which G(s) = 1 s and Σ is only lossless EIP. Then convergence is guaranteed for games with payoff U satisfying a strict version of Assumption 1(i), (strictly stable games in [15] ).
V. PASSIVITY-BASED HIGHER-ORDER EXP-D-RL
In this section, we propose a class of higher-order extension of the EXP-D-RL scheme (14) , based on passivity arguments. 
with ξ p (0) = 0. Letũ := u − v a denote the overall adjusted payoff, where v a denotes the overall adjustment. Then the overall players' learning dynamics (29) is given as
where A, B, C, D are block-diagonal matrices with A,B,C,D on the diagonal, respectively. Note that the modified H-EXP-D-RL scheme (30) can be represented as in Figure 2 , as a feedback interconnection betweenΣ and U , a feedback modification to EXP-D-RL in Figure 1 where,
is as a payoff-adjustment learning rule. Figure 2 , the forward path betweenũ and x is Σ as in (16) , which is OSEIP by Proposition 3. This means that feedback interconnection with another EIP system H a will be preserve passivity properties. This is used next. Theorem 2. Let G be a finite game with players' higherorder learning schemes as given by H-EXP-D-RL, (29), or (30) represented as in Figure 2 . Assume there are a finite number of isolated fixed-points z of U • σ. Assume that (31) is proper, strictly positive real, and H a (0) = 0 n . Then, under Assumption 1(i), for any > 0, players' scores z(t) = (z p (t)) p∈N converge to a z , while players' strategies x(t) = (x p (t)) p∈N , x(t) = σ(z(t)) converge to a Nash distribution x = σ(z ) of G. Under Assumption 1(ii), the same conclusions hold for any > µ.
Fig. 2: H-EXP-D-RL (29) as feedback interconnection In
Proof. At an equilibrium condition (ξ ,z ,x ,u ,v a ) of (30),
From the first and last line, z = U (σ(z )) − v a . Since H a is strictly positive real, A is Hurwitz, hence is invertible and from the second line we obtain, ξ = − A −1 B x and v a = (−C A −1 B + D)x . By assumption H a (0) = −C A −1 B + D = 0 n , so that v a = 0, and therefore (32) reduces to (18) . Thus, under H-EXP-D-RL, equilibria points z under EXP-D-RL are preserved, and x is a Nash distribution of G. To prove convergence of x(t) to x we leverage passivity properties of the subsystems in Figure 2 . Specifically, by Assumption 1(i), −U is incrementally passive, Σ fromũ to x is OSEIP (cf. Proposition 3) and H a is EIP passive.
Consider the positive semidefinite storage function of Σ, V z (z), (26) , as in the proof of Theorem 1. Taking the time derivative of V z (z) along the solutions z(t) in (30) , using the cocoercivity of σ and following the proof of Proposition 3, it can be shown thatV
Since H a (s) is strictly positive real, it is strictly passive and has a quadratic storage function V a (ξ) = γ 2 (ξ − ξ ) P(ξ − ξ ), where P is a positive definite matrix as given by the KYP Lemma, [21] , and the time derivative of V a along ξ(t),
Consider the composite Lyapunov function W (z, ξ) := V z (z) + V a (ξ). By construction, W (z, ξ) is positive semidefinite. Taking the time derivative along the solution trajectories of (30),Ẇ (z, ξ) =V a (ξ) +V z (z) = ∇V z (z) ż + ∇V a (ξ)ξ, and using (33), (34) and
, which is similar to (27) . From this point, the proof follows using the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 1, with A Hurwitz being used to show that the largest invariant subset of (30) 
Remark 10. We note that the higher-order dynamics proposed here, designed based on passivity principles, is guaranteed to maintain the same properties of convergence in monotone (stable) games as the first-order dynamics. This is unlike the higher-order dynamics proposed in [7] based on second-order (n-th order) integration of payoffs, which, as shown in [17] , are no longer passive and for which convergence in stable games is no longer guaranteed. A specific second-order score dynamics from this class of RL schemes can be obtained for
where K, a > 0. H a (s) = I n ⊗ G a (s) satisfies the conditions in Theorem 2 (by Lemma 6.1 in [21] ).
where u p = U p (x). Note that (35) represents a high-pass filter. We show in Section VII that for cyclical games such as the Rock-Paper-Scissors game, such a scheme can in fact foster convergence.
VI. CONNECTION TO POPULATION GAMES
In this section we offer a population game interpretation for the induced mixed-strategy dynamics of the reinforcement learning scheme. A population game involves a single (or multiple) large population(s) of agents interacting, whose members are anonymous. The agents are repeatedly randomly matched to play a symmetric two-player normal form game defined by strategy set A p and a payoff matrix A, or they could play "the field", as in congestion games, [15] . The identification between a large population game and continuous-time reinforcement learning is based on the fact that the dynamical equations governing the evolution of population states and those governing the evolution of mixed strategies are the same.
Consider first the induced strategy dynamics under EXP-D-RL, obtained as the set of ODEs that describe the evolution x(t) on ∆, as induced by the score dynamics (14) on R n . Note that based on
Taking the time derivative on both sides yields x (14) into the last expression, we obtain: 
Substituting the above expression into (38), we obtaiṅ
)) (39) Next, we study connections between (38) or (39) and existing population dynamics. Consider a single (or multiple) population(s) of agents. Each agent in population p is preprogrammed to play a certain pure strategy i ∈ A p . In this case, x p i is identified as the fraction of population p using strategy i ∈ A p . Furthermore, x p is a population state (corresponding to the mixed strategy of player p), and x refers to the overall population state. In population games generated by (random) matching in normal form games we can identify each population p with a player. We note that the single-player reinforcement learning (typically referred to as a "play against nature") is equivalent to a single-population matching. The evolution of population states in a population game can be modelled using a switching rule called the revision protocol, [15] . Formally, a revision protocol is a map
where ρ p ij ∈ R ≥0 is referred to as the conditional switch rate, proportional to the probability of agents in population p playing pure strategy i that switch to using strategy j. The flow of population share of agents under a particular revision protocol is given by, [15] ,
which is referred as the mean dynamics. The first term of (MD) represents the rate of inflow of agents adopting strategy i and the second term represents the rate of outflow of agents abandoning it. We note that when ρ 1 2 y (A + A )y ≤ 0, for all y ∈ T ∆, and Assumption 1 can be checked via the eigenvalues of A+A . Thus, Assumption 1(i) holds if A+A is negative semi-definite with respect to the tangent space T ∆. Moreover,
2 , for all y ∈ T ∆, where λ max (A + A ) is the maximum eigenvalue corresponding to an eigenvector in T ∆. Thus, Assumption 1(ii) holds with µ = Consider a large population of agents, each randomly matched with an opponent to play the Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) game characterized by the payoff matrix, [15] ,
where l is a parameter. For l = 1 this known as a standard RPS game (null stable, cf. [15, p. 79]). For l < 1 the game is strictly stable, while for l > 1 it unstable (or bad RPS, cf. [15] ). This game has a unique, interior Nash equilibrium x which coincides with the Nash distribution (logit equilibrium) x = , and for which z = 1−l 3 1. The eigenvalues of A + A are {2(1 − l), l − 1, l − 1} with the last two corresponding to eigenvectors in T ∆. Thus for l ≤ 1, A + A is negative semi-definite with respect to the tangent space T ∆ and satisfies Assumption 1(i). Note that for all 2 . We note that this lower bound is not tight, and in fact in simulations we see that convergence occurs even when it is violated. We show simulation results for the Rock-Paper-Scissors game with l = 1, 2.5, 5 and 8 in Figure 3 , Figure 4 , Figure 5 and Figure 6 , respectively, all for = 1. Each figure shows the score trajectories and the induced strategy trajectories in single-population, where the blue line corresponds to trajectory of (14) , while the red line corresponds to trajectory of (36) . For l = 1, 2.5, 5 the score trajectories z(t) of both (14) (blue) and (36) (red) converge to the corresponding z , 0, − 1 2 1, − 4 3 1, respectively, while the induced mixed-strategy x(t) trajectories converge to x , with the second-order converging faster than the first-order dynamics. For l = 8, (36) converges, whereas (14) forms a limit cycle in the interior of the simplex. Computing the Jacobian matrix of the dynamics (14) at z reveals that the eigenvalues are at {−1,
i}, so a bifurcation occurs at = l−1 6 , which for l = 8 is 7 6 . For the Jacobian matrix of the dynamics (36), a value of close to where the bifurcation occurs for l = 8 is 0.86 (computed numerically). This explains why, in the RPS game with l = 8, for = 1, (36) converges, whereas (14) does not. This example shows that the higher-order dynamics (36) can potentially solve larger classes of games ("more unstable"). Consider a population game in the class of concave potential games where the payoff vector U (x) can be expressed as the gradient of a C 1 , concave potential function, as in [15] , [6] . It is well-known that this class of potential games satisfies the monotonicity property in Assumption 1(i). Therefore by Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, the induced mixed strategy trajectories (14) and (36) are guaranteed to converge. Consider a well-known case of the 123 anti-coordination game [15] , with
The unique interior Nash equilibrium is located at x = [ (b) = 0.1 Fig. 7 : 123 Anti-Coordination Game In the following three examples we consider two-player (asymmetric) games. We use the convention in [3] , [14] , where player 1 is the "row" player with payoff matrix A and player 2 is the "column" player with payoff matrix B, so that
Since U is linear, (24) can be checked based on Φ, hence on the payoff matrices of the two players, A and B. Note that (24) is equivalent to −(x − x ) Φ(x − x ) ≥ 0, for all x, x ∈ ∆, hence if and only if y (Φ + Φ )y ≤ 0 for all y ∈ T ∆. Thus Assumption 1(i) holds if Φ+Φ is negative semidefinite with respect to T ∆. Similarly, Assumption 1(ii) holds for µ = Note that Φ + Φ = 0 A + B A + B 0 , so that the eigenvalues of Φ + Φ are the square roots of the eigenvalues of (A + B)(A + B) (cf. Lemma 4.4 in [29] ). This means that Φ+Φ has always positive and negative eigenvalues, hence all two-player games that satisfy Assumption 1(i) are null stable (null monotone). Example 3. Two-player Matching Pennies (MP) Game In this game, player 1 and 2 flip a coin and reveal them simultaneously. If the coins of the two players both land on head (or tail), then player 1 earns a payoff +1 from player 2, otherwise, player 2 earns a payoff +1 from player 1. The payoff matrices are given by,
so this is a zero-sum game. The unique interior Nash equilibrium is given by x = , and coincides with the logit equilibrium x . The payoff vector is given by,
(45) Since Φ + Φ T = 0, Assumption 1(i) is satisfied. By Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, for l = 1, both first, (14) , and higher-order, (36) learning dynamics, are guaranteed to converge for any > 0. Simulations results are shown in Figure 8 and Figure 9 for = 1 and γ = 1, and γ = 4, respectively. The dotted line represents the induced strategy trajectories of (14), whereas the solid line represents the induced strategy trajectories of (36) . It can be seen from the simulation that all the mixed strategy trajectories converge to the Nash equilibrium and that a higher learning rate γ increases the convergence speed. ). The payoff vector is
where A is as in (42). The eigenvalues of A+B = A + A are {2(l − 1), 1 − l, 1 − l} (see Example 1) . Then, the eigenvalues of Φ + Φ are {±2(l − 1), ±(1 − l), ±(1 − l)}. For l = 1, Assumption 1(i) holds; this is the zero-sum game considered in [3] . On the other hand, for l = 1 the game satisfies Assumption 1(ii) for µ = 1 2 |l − 1|. Thus, in this case even for l < 1 the game is unstable. By Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, for l = 1, both first, (14) , and higher-order, (36) learning dynamics, are guaranteed to converge for any > 0, while for l = 1, they are guaranteed to globally converge for > 1 2 |l−1|. As in Example 1, the bound on is not tight. Figure 10 shows the induced strategy trajectories of the two players under (14) (dotted line) and (36) (solid line), for = 1, in the standard RPS game (l = 1) and unstable RPS game (l = 5), respectively, indicating convergence to x = x . We study the critical value of for which bifurcation occurs by computing the eigenvalues of the Jacobian of (14) and (36) at equilibrium. For l = 5 the critical value for bifurcation for the first-order dynamics (14) is * = 2 3 , while numerically for (36) is * = 0.347, with stable dynamics for > * . In Figure 11 we show the error plots from equilibrium for = 0.5 for both learning dynamics. It can be seen that the higher-order dynamics (36) converges, while (14) cycles, confirming the conclusion that for the same the higher-order dynamics can converge in a larger class of games (more hypo-monotone). Example 5. Two-player Shapley Game Consider the Two-player Shapley game discussed in [3] . The payoff matrices of this game are given by,
and this is as l = 0 in the RPS game (Example 4), so µ = 1 2 , an unstable game. In Fig. 12(a) and (b) we compare the strategy trajectories for player 1 under (14) with = 0.1, in the standard RPS game (l = 1) (a) and in the Shapley game (l = 0) (b), respectively. We note that in the Shapley game a cycle is formed corresponding to Shapley triangle as in [3] . However, by Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, both learning dynamics are guaranteed to converge for > 1 2 . In Figure 13 we show strategy trajectories under (14) and (36) for = 1; it can be seen that both (14) (dotted line) and (36) (solid line) converge. Unlike [3] , there is no need for player-dependent learning rates that satisfy a singular perturbation specific relationship, (cf. PDRL in Proposition 5.4, [3] ). Consider a network represented by a finite, fully connected, undirected graph G = (N , E) where N is the set of vertices (players) and E ⊂ N × N is the set of edges. Given two vertices (players) p, q ∈ N , we assume that there is a zerosum game on the edge (p, q) given by the payoff matrices (A p,q , A q,p ), whereby A q,p = −A p,q . Assume that N = 3 players are arranged in network G as shown in Figure 14 and the payoff matrix is that of a Matching Pennies (MP) game,
with the Nash equilibrium at Let the payoff matrices for each edge be given as,
Since each pair-wise interaction between players is a zero-sum game, the payoff vector of the overall player set is given by
Thus U (x) = Φx, where Φ + Φ T = 0, so that this game is a null monotone game, cf. Assumption 1(i). Hence, by Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, (14) and (36) , respectively, converge for any > 0. Strategy trajectories of (14) (dotted line) and (36) (solid line) are plotted in Figure 15 , indicating convergence. Example 7. Jordan Three-Player Matching Pennies Game The three-player Jordan game is a generalization of the TwoPlayer Matching Pennies game [2, p. 22] . In this game, each player flips a coin and reveals them simultaneously. Player 1 wins if the outcome matches that of player 2. Player 2 wins if the outcome match that of player 3. Player 3 wins if the outcome does not match that of player 1. Let player 1 be the row player, and player 2 be the column one. The payoff matrices can be represented as in Table 1 . The unique Nash for each player. Even though the payoff vector is no longer linear, it can be shown that it satisfies Assumption 1(i). The payoff vector for the player set can be written as 1(ii) ). Figure Figure 16 shows strategy trajectories of all players under (14) (dotted line) and (36) (solid line), indicating convergence to the Nash equilibrium.
In order to study the behaviour of EXP-D-RL (14) and H-D-EXP-RL(36) in some difficult games, in the following we consider two modified RPS games (as in [30] ), and a modified asymmetric Jordan game (as in [10] ). with the −1 and +1 eigenvalues corresponding to an eigenvector in the tangent space. Thus the first modified RPS game A is stable (monotone), while the second modified RPS game A is unstable (hypo-monotone with µ = 0.5). By Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, in the first RPS game A, the two dynamics, (14) and (36) , are guaranteed to converge to a Nash distribution for any > 0, while in the second RPS game A, the two dynamics are guaranteed to converge to a Nash distribution for any > 0.5. In Fig. 17 and Fig. 18 we show simulations in both games (side by side (a) and (b)), for = 1 and = 0.2, respectively, with trajectories for (14) in blue and those for (36) in red, respectively. It can be seen that for = 1 in both games, both dynamics converge to the corresponding Nash distribution (logit equilibrium), which in either game does not coincide with the Nash equilibrium (marked with in the plots). For = 1, in the first RPS game A, the Nash distribution is at x = (0.379, 0.2997, 0.3213), while for the second RPS game A, the Nash distribution is at x = (0.2741, 0.3647, 0.3612). On the other hand for = 0.2, in the first RPS game A, the Nash distribution is x = (0.4025, 0.3024, 0.2951) (very close to the Nash equilibrium x ), and as seen in Fig. 18(a) , both dynamics converge to it. This cannot be said for the second RPS game A for = 0.2; as seen in Fig. 18(b) , the firstorder dynamics (14) has a limit cycle, while the higher-order dynamics (36) converges to the corresponding Nash distribution, which is x = (0.2653, 0.3237, 0.4109) (very close to the corresponding Nash equilibrium x ). This confirms our previous observations regarding the better performance of the higher-order dynamics (36) . We note that for = 0.1, in the second RPS game A, both dynamics have a limit cycle. ). In Fig. 19 we display the strategy trajectory plots the three players for = 0.1, which show that the first-order dynamics (14) (dotted line) has a limit cycle, while the higher-order dynamics (36) (solid line) converges to the Nash distribution, close to Nash equilibrium. 
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a passivity-based approach for analyzing first-order exponentially-discounted reinforcement learning (EXP-D-RL) dynamics. We have shown convergence for games characterized by their monotonicity property. We further exploited passivity properties to propose a class of higherorder schemes that preserve convergence properties, can improve the speed of convergence and, as shown numerically, can even converge in cases whereby their first-order counterpart fail to converge. We demonstrated these properties through numerical simulations for several representative games.
